

## The integrity and interpretation Some remarks on philosophical musicology

Reflection on the problem of interpretation can only proceed via a diagnosis of the situation of the academic disciplines within which it is taken up and the areas which a given discipline shares with other fields of knowledge about man and the world. There is no question that these common fields, or places of interdisciplinary insight, today represent the most appealing challenge for every self-reflective discipline, including musicology. That which is “between”, which arises as the effect of musicology’s encounter with history, anthropology, literary studies or philosophy, and also with the natural sciences as broadly understood, has a decisive and undoubtedly most inspiring influence on determining and penetrating the subject range of our discipline. Such a point of view requires reference to a model of musicology illumined by the postulate of a radical openness towards and confrontation with other fields and the worldviews that inform them. It is often questioned whether the achievements of other disciplines can be applied in musicology. Doubts, or even reservations, regarding the aptness of such borrowings continue to appear, born of the conviction of the radically specific status of the subject of our discipline and doubts as to the scientific reliability of premises adopted by representatives of other disciplines.

The dynamic of the changes which musicology has undergone over the last quarter century, stimulated, among other things, by the radical theses contained in Joseph Kerman’s 1985 work *Musicology*, chiefly reflects a gradual process of catch-up in respect to other humanities. Musicology has no choice but to forcefully question

its philosophical and methodological foundations – something which “new musicologists” have been demanding for years, and the need for which can be seen every step of the way. Above all, this postulate relates to a counterbalancing of the influences which the post-neopositivist point of view continues to exert over musicology today. This standpoint is expressed in such things as essentially archaic tendencies towards the autonomisation of the subject of musicology and the mainly analytical methods it cultivates, an open or concealed favouring of description (the role of the above-mentioned methods of analysis strictly linked to the category of description) and the treatment of interpretation as a complement to description in the domains of aesthetics, ideology, cultural-historical context, and so on. An important role is played here by the historicocentric tendency, which does not always take account of the fundamental changes which history as a discipline has been subject to in recent years (new historicism, narrativism and “ethic turn”; works by Haydon White, Francis Ankersmitt and Dominik LaCapra). The proponents of the post-neopositivist current focus their attention on traditionally-defined sources (the document, and not testimony, which is important, for example, from the point of view of contemporary culture), reluctantly pursue more profound methodological reflection, particularly self-evaluative, and also avoid axiological issues.

Musicology which opposes the domination and narrow perspective of post-neopositivist thinking may head in many directions, two of which seem particularly inspiring. The first of these, the direction of postmodernist pluralism, posits the equal treatment of all cognitive and methodological categories within an increasingly extensive subject field, pushing back the boundaries of our discipline. One may confidently state that this direction is based on two premises: the first states that culture in its full diversity cannot exclude any of its fruits, even those of lethal consequence (e.g. Adolf Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*). It should, in a free, critical and responsible way, rectify their influence and significance among the users of a culture by creating alternatives. The same applies to academic learning, which also cannot exclude even the most radical and isolated views. This is one of the primary parameters of an open musicology which, having divested itself of any sort of self-indulgent motivation guaranteeing its internally homogeneous and monochromatic picture, must seek intellectual justification for its multi-faceted enquiry in the name of the idea of opposition that has helped to forge the uniqueness of the European heritage. Defending an unfettered freedom of choice and the implementing of a chosen interpretational strategy, governed by its own logic, postmodernist pluralism recommends a wariness of those consequences of learning in which Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno saw just another historical example of enslavement and totalitarianism<sup>1</sup>. The second premise of postmodernist thinking concerns the structure, function and message of the humanistic discourse. Anarchisation in the methodological domain and a mixing of different kinds of narration, against a highly critical assessment of realistic narrative and its capacity for capturing the whole subject area, have both ardent supporters, democratically inclined to observe the rules of academic writing, and also opponents. Dispute can be neither avoided nor even weakened, since we are dealing with such things as value judgments, the strong subjectivisation of narration and the subject’s engagement in the reality which occupies him.

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<sup>1</sup> M. Jabłoński, P. Podlipniak, *Music as a Medium of Communication. Two Visions of Musicology*, „Interdisciplinary Studies in Musicology” 2008, vol. 7, p. 15-34.

The other direction sets one of the cognitive categories in a clearly privileged position. This is interpretation, not any particular interpretation, but the problem and notion itself. I call this direction pan-interpretationism, with its origins in the thinking of Friedrich Nietzsche and in more recent times the views of Gunther Abel and Hans Lenk<sup>2</sup>. Interpretation is the elementary understanding of the world in its full plenitude, from the sensory to the reflective domain. Abel writes: “Everything that exists, interprets. All becoming is interpreting. There is no reality, only interpretations”. His “law of interpretation” (Satz der Interpretation) informs us unambiguously that “every man can grasp and define reality only within the specific interpretational schema which he himself [is]”<sup>3</sup>. And the crux lies not in the radical thesis according to which paninterpretationists (not all of them, at least) negate the existence of objective reality, but in the fact that they maintain that it reaches us solely through interpretation. In my detailed considerations of this subject, I have put forward certain parameters of interpretation which tally with the premises outlined above, namely the *continual*, *vital* and *creative* character of interpretation<sup>4</sup>. The paninterpretationist also posits that interpretation necessarily stands at the centre of the interests of contemporary musicology, which possesses expansive interdisciplinary ambitions; including in the direction of the natural sciences, let us add.

However, reference to a model of genuine interdisciplinarity, and so such which at least listens to the voices of natural scientists and satisfies the postulate of open musicology, brings with it a certain problem. Interpretation becomes the subject of a quite crucial polemic, carried on by representatives of the natural and the human sciences, on the role of language in contemporary learning and the question of empirical knowledge. Lee Smolin states: “for humanists, the starting point for intellectual activity is a text and it is also its effect”, and “the basic method of scientific inquiry is interpretation”<sup>5</sup>. This accusation concerns primarily the question of empirical knowledge. Science deals with reality and not the fictional products on its subject that arise as a result of the cogitations of philosophers and humanists. Natural science does not accept empirically unsubstantiated humanistic notions and is wary of the humanistic predilection for language which admits of nebulousness, vagueness and a limited lack of precision, unacceptable in science. It may, therefore, reinforce the diagnosis formulated in 1959 by Charles Percy Snow in *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*. Snow put forward the thesis that humanists – whom he called “literary intellectuals” – are incapable of reaching agreement with naturalists, representing a scientific point of view. The critique of the humanities and humanists that was cultivated by “third culture” movement<sup>6</sup> is based on the following observations: humanists deal with “texts” (language) and not reality; thus they are characterised by a non-empirical approach, they build complex linguistic structures that are incomprehensible to anyone

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<sup>2</sup> G. Abel, *Nietzsche. Die Dynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr*, Berlin 1984. See also: H. Lenk, *Transzendentaler Interpretationismus: Ein Philosophischer Entwurf*, in: H. Holz (ed.), *Die Goldene Regel der Kritik. Festschrift für Hans Radermacher zum 60. Geburtstag*, Berlin 1990, p. 121-135.

<sup>3</sup> H. Lenk, *Transzendentaler Interpretationismus*, pol. trans. Z. Zwoliński as *Filozofia pragmatycznego interpretacjonizmu*, Warsaw 1995, p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> M. Jabłoński, *Interpreting Music. The Language and Silence of Musicology*, forthcoming.

<sup>5</sup> M. Jabłoński, P. Podlipniak, *Music as a Medium of Communication*, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> J. Brockman, *The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution*, New York 1995.

but themselves; they are unfamiliar with the achievements of contemporary science, by the same token advocating an obsolete educational canon.

Yet the dispute between humanists and “third culture” natural scientists is not confined to the problems of language and the empirical foundations of learning. In *Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendente Phenomenologie* (1936), Edmund Husserl expressed the fear that contemporary learning would lead to the emancipation of technology and to productiveness and effectiveness being set up as the main criteria justifying its dominant position among the advancements of civilisation. Thus a number of key problems disappear from the field of vision of scholarly thinking shaped in this way: questions about the meaning of life, about the condition of modern man, about the meaning and role of culture in times of a permanent crisis of values, and so on. The loss of interest in these questions among men of learning, or their reduction to the answers provided by natural science, must arouse serious reservations. The reductionism of the natural sciences and the radical empiricism on which they are founded delimit the boundaries of learning and the criteria of cognitive validity. The first and most crucial difficulty is linked to the reduction concerning the ontology of the subject. The question of how we usually understand music, and especially how we comprehend the musical work, as a distinct and unitary phenomenon, and its axiology, is for humanists a matter of culture and history rather than, for example, biology. For scientists, reduction as a rejection of history is a precondition for adopting a scientific approach, and the multiplicity, diversity and interpretations of the notions and categories provided by history are treated as secondary. What is more, such an understanding of reduction forces us into the thesis that the unity of science can only be effected on the basis of the achievements of natural science and not according to the solutions adopted by “literary” intellectuals<sup>7</sup>. Without entering here into detailed considerations of reduction and its consequences and of other weighty issues it is worth noting that contemporary views on the ontological status of the subject of musicological study fall into three camps. The first, nominalist, standpoint derives, among other things, from the conviction that there are no longer any meaningful grounds for drawn-out and unproductive discussion of the identity of the musical work. The wholly responsible use today of the category of the work results in extensive and important areas of the musical activity of modern man being cast out from under the umbrella of musicology. In some sense, nominalism is a safe way out here, and faith, as a criterion of art, is an epistemological justification.

The second current comprises essentialist thinking<sup>8</sup>. The adoption of an essentialist stance is associated with many inconveniences, particularly when the object of our interest is contemporary artistic practice, the multiformity of the objects referred to as aesthetic objects and certain features of essentialism itself, which are treated distrustfully today. On one hand, the question of the “essence” of art boils down to an answer to the question of the necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied for us to con-

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<sup>7</sup> See: M. Jabłoński, P. Podlipniak, *op. cit.*, p. 18. In that text I also discuss questions that are important for the debate on the relations between the humanities and the sciences: the unity of knowledge and cognitive finitism/infinitism. The essence of the humanities is the continuity and inexhaustibility of cognition. Art has the capacity to continually invalidate knowledge about it, and it also naturally gives rise to conflictive interpretations.

<sup>8</sup> M. Jabłoński, *Is the essential in music still possible?*, forthcoming.

sider a given object to be a work, although many philosophers and aestheticians have now mollified their stance, enquiring merely of the necessary conditions of this relationship (Arthur Danto in his later works). The difficulties which arise from the postulate of showing the conditions of both kinds, those essential properties, also result from a lack of certainty as to whether there exists a genuine need to construct a general theory of art and they are the effect of fundamental doubts over the possibility of defining essential properties. On the other hand, philosophers often raise the argument that essentialism is burdened with negative connotations; it is also sometimes treated as a dogma, and its advocates do not see the complexity of the world of art that surrounds us<sup>9</sup>. It is clearly the essential aspect of “something” (music) that determines whether it is what it is. It is also clear that inasmuch as there exists at all something like the “essence of art” – and not that art (music) is “something” which we call art (music) or “something” which we believe to be art – it seems necessary to summon convincing arguments in favour of essentialism, with which, in light of the multitude of phenomena nowadays labelled “art”, many scholars wrestle in earnest... albeit without success. This rift – the inability to answer the questions as to whether an essentialist interpretation of music is at all possible today, and if so under what terms – has moved Aaron Ridley to reject ontology in favour of aesthetics<sup>10</sup>. This gesture of Ridley’s may be regarded as pointing to a third way – towards aesthetics. The directing of musicology’s attention towards the question of aesthetic experience, of experience other than the solely empirical, of the processes and criteria of value judgment, and of the language which, in this way of thinking about music, gains in subjectivity, gives rise to a rich set of inspiring issues. And just as importantly, it concerns interpretation, its subjective sources and limits, and the freedom to forge interpretational, subjectocentric, strategies.

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The question of ‘integrity’ and its criteria may be posed with account taken of the many perspectives employed by musicology: the historical, when we refer to the concept of *ars perfecta* as opposed to *amor infini*; the aesthetic, referring to the idea of autonomy, when we state that we cannot deprive a work, or add to it, any element which does not come from its author (*Geschlossenheit*); the analytical (in a restricted sense of the word), maintaining that the integrity of a work rests on its tonal and formal coherence. Finally, we may tacitly assume the existence of “some” form of integrity, based on sources, pre-constitutive in relation to that which this integrity concretises and maintains.

However, taking the philosophical aspect into account above all, I discern several significations of the notion of “integrity”, which I would like to discuss in brief:

- 1) The integrity of all things, derived from the argument of the harmony and symmetry of the cosmos, united by a musical ideal. Let us recall that this is exactly what Hermann Hesse’s creation Lü Bu We had in mind in *The Glass Bead Game*:

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<sup>9</sup> See: A. Danto, *After the End of Art*, Princeton 1997, p. 139.

<sup>10</sup> This issue is addressed in my article *Interpretation as a Centre of Self-Critical Musicology*, forthcoming. See: A. Ridley, *The Philosophy of Music. Theme and Variations*, Edinburgh 2004, p. 113-131.

“Perfect music has its cause. It arises from equilibrium. Equilibrium arises from righteousness, and righteousness arises from the meaning of the cosmos”<sup>11</sup>. Music, which permeates the universe and man, becomes the object of a cult shaping the life of man in everyday harmony, purity (the aforementioned clarity gains a further significance) and closeness to the truth.

- 2) Integrity from the perspective of the hierarchy of entities, of which the fundamental entity has an integrating power; e.g. sign as a triad in Charles S. Peirce philosophy of signs. This triadic relationship creates an unbroken sequence of mediations, as is worth remembering, particularly when speaking about the phasic manifestation of the work in culture, and especially about the sphere of reception. Continual mediation, occurring via the intermediary of the sign, precludes any closure of the sphere of reception in either the time or the space of a given culture. Quite the opposite: it renders reception irrepressibly dynamic and creative.
- 3) The integrity which signifies the original indivisibility of sensory cognition into the separate senses: “original unity broken up into the imperfection of the senses”<sup>12</sup>.
- 4) The integrity of existence orientated towards special kinds of value and emotional involvement, without which the cognition and comprehension of reality becomes impossible; the integrating role would therefore be fulfilled by inner experience.
- 5) The integrity of word and deed, the concordance of the intention and the sense of the work, and so authenticity (some even prefer to speak of “truth”); authenticity – excellence: the *integritas – consonantia – perfectio* of Aquinas.

Each of the meanings of the notion of “integrity” invoked here, and all the others for which space was wanting, could acquire reflections of quite sizeable proportions. However, two solutions seem worthy of particular attention. The first is based on the ontological interpretation of integrity, whilst the second is connected to the category of experience. The application of the premises of theories of integral ontology (e.g. that of Andrzej Chmielecki) to musicology requires not only consideration but also a hefty dose of boldness, given the nature of our subject – music, which makes any sort of consideration on the subject of its ontological status engender doubts and at times even disappointments (this was demonstrated by Zofia Lissa and other critics of Ingarden’s theory, it was shown by Ridley in a dispute with advocates of “identity” conceptions of the musical work, and it is indicated by the debate between Platonist and anti-Platonist philosophers that was carried on a few years ago on the pages of *The British Journal of Aesthetics*)<sup>13</sup>.

Assuming for a moment that an attempt at such an application might succeed, one should enumerate at least a few of the premises of integral ontology, the first of which is considered fundamental. This is the premise that there exists some basic entity, One, from which many arise, which ensures continuity and determines the transformations and multiplication of that which is Primary. Such thinking has its deeply historically-ro-

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<sup>11</sup> H. Hesse, *The Glass Bead Game*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston, Harmondsworth, UK 1979, p. 31.

<sup>12</sup> M. Podraza-Kwiatkowska, *O muzycznej i niemuzycznej koncepcji poezji* [On a musical and non-musical conception of poetry], in: A. Hejmej (ed.), *Muzyka w literaturze* [Music in literature], Kraków 2002, p. 49.

<sup>13</sup> J. Dodd, *Works of Music. An Essay in Ontology*, Oxford 2007.

oted justification in the form of the Great Chain of Being, “composed of an immense, or – by the strict but seldom rigorously applied logic of the principle of continuity – of an infinite, number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kinds of existents, which barely escape non-existence, through «every possible» grade up to the *ens perfectissimum*”<sup>14</sup>. Leszek Nowak, a philosopher particularly close to my own way of thinking on the postulates of the interpenetration of philosophy and literature and the links between art and science (poetry and idealistic method in science) approaches the problem of a distinguished basic entity in the following way: “A variety of metaphysical doctrines fall within a certain common structure. First they identify entities which exist, and then they postulate the relationship in which something must stand to something which has already been deemed an entity in order to be deemed an entity itself”<sup>15</sup>. Nowak clarifies that “the history of European philosophy adheres to a certain line of development”, marked by four paradigms: the “realcentric” (the basic entities are external to man and may be both material and ideal), “theocentric” (the absolute is the only basic entity), “anthropocentric” (man occupies the place of things, ideas or God; this paradigm was fixed by Descartes in his *cogitationes*, “and the existence of everything else (...) must be deducible from the original premise of the existence of the human I”<sup>16</sup>) and “sociocentric”, in which the basic entity is a collectivity, and not a single person. Nowak, studying the memorably inspiring, albeit controversial, thought of Andrzej Falkiewicz, adds “subjectcentricism”, derived from that thought, where the primary entity is “I”, the “subjectum”, the “individual”. Two modest quotes from Falkiewicz’s views show what the Poznań philosopher had in mind: “living in the world, I am already together with it, always *I am it*. And so the problem of being of the world is above all a problem of *me being*, the only intimate problem which I resolve competently and in my own name”; “(...) that which I cognise as a private person and which I study as a humanist, biologist, physicist and microphysicist *is a network of subjective and objective relations*, a product of relationships about which my own relationship with the world can give me an approximate – yet the only available – idea”<sup>17</sup>. Availing ourselves of a few random examples, we would say that the realcentric paradigm (materialistic variant) would embrace the view of Nelson Goodman, who posited in *Languages of Art* that the “score thus defines the work” and that “complete compliance with the score is the only requirement for a genuine instance of a work”<sup>18</sup>. Peter Kivy, meanwhile, suggests that musical works are generalities, pre-compositional tonal structures of a sort, the performances of which are their embodiments or signs; Kivy thus places himself within the same paradigm, but in the idealistic variant. Marxist theories, meanwhile, including the theory of reflection, will be placed within the sociocentric paradigm (some theories advanced by anthropologists could also be located here, as well as within the anthropocentric paradigm, from John Blacking’s “How musical is Man?” to theses formulated by cognitivists or biomusicologists. Let us note that the anthropocentric, or more neatly

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<sup>14</sup> A.O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, Cambridge, Mass. 1936, p. 59.

<sup>15</sup> L. Nowak, *Zagadka punktu wyjścia [The conundrum of the point of departure]*, Poznańskie Studia z Filozofii Humanistyki, vol. 5 (18), p. 43.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>17</sup> A. Falkiewicz, *Istnienie i metafora [Existence and Metapher]*, Poznańskie Studia z Filozofii Humanistyki, vol. 3 (16), p. 156, 168.

<sup>18</sup> N. Goodman, *Languages of Art*, Indianapolis 1976, p. 178, 186.

anthropotelic<sup>19</sup>, paradigm abounds in *loci commune* with the sociocentric paradigm, on account, among other things, of the integrating role of the cognitive triad of “senses – reason – faith” which Pitirim Sorokin regarded as the basic components of his theoretical system known in sociology as “integralism”).

In Chmielecki’s opinion, integral ontology is “the most general theory of reality”, and the notion of being has a contextual character, which means that it assumes the existence of other entities; “(...) the existence of some entity is at once necessarily its coexistence with other entities”, he writes<sup>20</sup>. From the point of view of integral ontology and its premises, which was my point of departure here, it is important to correctly interpret the entity composed of “essence” and “existence”, defined by factors of determination (these determine what an entity is – its essence, including the essence of music) and factors of realisation (these, in turn, determine the existence of an entity, that is, its appearance and duration, including the existence of music, the Ingardenian “musical work as a phenomenon manifesting itself in the cultural space in a phasically differentiated way”). These factors could also serve – if we accepted and developed the premises of integral ontology – the reality of art, which is the bearer of values; Chmielecki speaks about this, although he treats values as ideal entities, distinguished from empirical products. The heart of the problem lies in the fact that such values fulfil neither the criterion of acting or being a source of changes in something else, for example in the relationship “art” – “man”, nor the criterion of being an object of effect, that is, being altered by outside action<sup>21</sup>. Finally, it is time to note that integral ontology grants existential fundamentality to some form of physical, although not necessarily material, existence and treats the ultimate establishing of that which exists in the form of some ideal entity (the differences between Chmielecki and Nowak on this matter would require a separate discussion). On this last issue, Chmielecki writes: “thus the «establishing» of something is that by which that something is defined, it is the source of its essential properties, its being something specific”; it falls to us, therefore, to consider the question as to which of the external determinants “establishes”, is the source of the essential properties of art, and of music in particular, since both are encompassed by “the most general theory of reality”, that is, integral ontology<sup>22</sup>.

A separate – and striking – issue arises from Nowak’s subjectocentrism, namely experience – most probably inner experience. This problem is all the more striking in that the figures of the critical thought of our times which serve to break up the identity “I” include the dismantling of the Cartesian *cogito* and also Lacan’s assertion that “I” does not exist, but only occurs, most commonly “in brief moments of perfect anarchy, of

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<sup>19</sup> A.L. Zachariasz, *Czy humanizm jest antropotelizmem? [Is humanism anthropotelism?]*, in: T. Szkołut (ed.), *Humanizm. Tradycje i przyszłość [Humanism. Traditions and future]*, Lublin 2003, p. 151-174. Anthropotelism holds that man is an entity that acts with a purpose. Besides this, Zachariasz distinguishes the “cosmocentric” paradigm, which could contain the first of the meanings of “integrity” enumerated in the present article (Hesse quote) and supplement Nowak’s list.

<sup>20</sup> A. Chmielecki, *Ontologia integralna [Integral ontology]*, in: *Wykłady z ontologii [Lectures on ontology]*, [www.wnsts.strony.univ.gda.pl/.../chmielewski-w-ontologia-2006.pdf](http://www.wnsts.strony.univ.gda.pl/.../chmielewski-w-ontologia-2006.pdf), p. 64.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 66, 72. A conception of integral ontology constructed in this way would not, therefore, encompass the view of music according to which it possesses the capacity to affect the receiver, or it should be said at least that this capacity is not connected with the sphere of values (expression – in one of the meanings of this notion – as a value).

<sup>22</sup> A. Chmielecki, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

discontinuity”<sup>23</sup>. The propositions for extreme solutions, born in contemporary culture, such as a particular kind of experience of reading which weakens the subject, leading to its reinterpretation (as in *Thomas the Obscure*, by Maurice Blanchot, for whom experience is transcendence and destabilisation), collide with attempts – drawn from a completely different perspective – to reconstitute the Schopenhauerian “contemplation”<sup>24</sup>, or the Schellingian “blessed silence”, reflection on oneself and removing the questions of art from the jurisdiction of time, located within the concept of an *absolute present*. These and other views, such as Charles Taylor’s considerations of the subjectivity of language and the understanding – Romantic in spirit – of that which is individual, exemplify the problem of experience as a task for contemporary human science, with particular focus on such questions as “modernity as experience”, “the immediacy of experience” (Eggebrecht writes that the experiencing of music, like no other art form, is imbued with immediacy), “the extinction of experience”, “the uncertainty of experience”, “cognition – apprehension – experiencing”, or finally the “discursive mediation of experience”. The tension that is expressed in the relations “between (...) experiential immediacy and (...) the discursive mediation of that experience” constitutes, regardless of the evaluation of that state of affairs, one of the main – and still inspiring – points of reference for the inevitably polyphonic debate on the role of experience in our cognition and experiencing of the world, including art<sup>25</sup>. Perceiving the category of experience from the perspective of the “third modernity” (Stephen Toulmin’s term) not only imposes the above questions, which ignite discussions of the elusiveness of the object of reflection, and even its inaccessibility or the limits of its extremity (e.g. representations of the Holocaust). These discussions very often draw on the wide-ranging etymology of this notion, pointing to semantic fields created in the history and practice of various languages, referring to such meanings as ‘being in passage’ and “openness to boundless space”, “perception and knowledge”, “intentional action”, and finally, most crucially, “putting oneself to the test”, describing the possible negative consequences of our contact with the world, the uncertainty and fear which are the result of sensory participation and action, including the gaining or accumulating of experience, in the world (a motif employed in the deconstructionist concepts of experience of Blanchot and Jacques Derrida)<sup>26</sup>.

Therefore, musicology in respect to modernity has also to consider the problem of experience in all its subtle riches, certainly not reduced merely to the laws of per-

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<sup>23</sup> A. Bielik-Robson, *Inna Nowoczesność. Pytania o współczesną formułę duchowości* [*Another modernity. Questions of a contemporary formula for spirituality*], Kraków 2000, p. 75.

<sup>24</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer writes: “(...) we forget our individuality, our will, and continue to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object (...)”, in: *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E.F.J. Payne, New York 1966, p. 178. Cf. K.H. Bohrer, *Absolutna terażniejszość*, trans. K. Krzemieniowa, Warsaw 2003, p. 198 [Ger. orig. *Das absolute Präsens*, Frankfurt am Main 1994].

<sup>25</sup> M. Jay, *Granice doświadczenia granicznego* [*The limits of critical experience*], in: M. Kwiec (ed.), *Nie pytajcie mnie, kim jestem. Michel Foucault dzisiaj* [*Don't ask me who I am. Michel Foucault today*], Poznań 1998, p. 59.

<sup>26</sup> R. Nycz, *O nowoczesności jako doświadczeniu* [*On modernity as experience*], „Teksty Drugie” 2006, No 3, p. 8-9. See also: B. Skarga, *Kwintet metafizyczny* [*Metaphysical quintet*], Kraków 2005, p. 120, and A. Leśniak, *Blanchot, Derrida. Topografie doświadczenia* [*Blanchot and Derrida. The topography of experience*], Kraków 2003, p. 7-8 (the etymology cited here also includes “danger”, “boundary” and “threat”).

ception and to conclusions issuing from reflection and research conducted as part of the “biomusicology paradigm”. The discussion of the figures of subjectivity carried on, by no means furtively, by Carolyn Abbate<sup>27</sup> and Karol Berger<sup>28</sup> and in the text by Ridley already cited several times here, rejecting ontology in favour of aesthetics, that is, performance and its experiencing, are good examples of the interest in this problem among musicologists. The question of the immediacy of the experiencing of music and its discursive fruits is not exclusively a dilemma of post-modern humanists, as it was discussed in the 1920s by Charles Seeger, fully aware of the gulf that arises between experience of music and its verbalisation. The American musicologist firmly maintained that “musical knowledge”, which arises as part of the process of practising music, of intimate and intuitive contact with it, never translates satisfactorily into “knowledge about music”, which helps to form the foundations of the science that musicology would be. Thus musical experience is experience *of music*, and not triggered by music. In this context, it is worth noting the words of Leo Tolstoy, which reflect another very interesting example of experience: “While I listened [to the music of Chopin – M.J.], I became as one with Chopin; I felt as if I had composed the piece myself”<sup>29</sup>. Kendall Walton, for his part, develops this idea of the artist, confirming us in the conviction of the extraordinary, but also mysterious, nature of this experience: “I feel intimate with the music – more intimate, even, than I feel with the world of the painting. The word of the painting (...) is *out there*, something I observe from an external perspective. But it is as though I am inside the music, or it is inside me. (...) a most personal and subjective manner” (Marcia Herndon calls this phenomenon “flow”). Thus we speak about reception, about experience in which the subject “merges” with the object, is unable to build any distance in respect to it, cannot distinguish himself and music as two independently existing entities. We also speak about reception which absorbs the listener, his whole physical being and awareness, to such an extent that he does not notice the world around him<sup>30</sup>.

This kind of experience can certainly be called “integral”, due to the sense of the unity, the indivisibility of the two entities: the musical work and the receiver. Understood in this way, integrity takes on a special dimension, if we take into account the case of the artistic performance of a musical work or even the inspiring concept of “music as performance”, willingly discussed today. “Between the script of the score (...) and us lies a huge, phenomenal explosion, performance”, writes Abbate. Phenomenal in that it has an ethical dimension, although ethicality is here in some sense confined to the sphere which is enclosed on one hand by the rules and norms of the profession and on the other by the integrity of the performer (e.g. in respect to the *intentio auctoris*, if we ascribe to this instance a central, or at least a significant, role in the hierarchy of the sources of musical sense). This sort of integrity is “weaker” than integrity in the strictly moral sense – that which we consider as referring to the value of virtue and to the identity of man. Hence reference to the quasi-moral character of “integrity as a professio-

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<sup>27</sup> C. Abbate, *Music – Drastic Or Gnostic?*, “Critical Inquiry” 2004, No 30, p. 505–536.

<sup>28</sup> K. Berger, *Musicology according to Don Giovanni, or: should we get drastic?*, “Journal of Musicology” 2005, No 22/3, p. 490-501.

<sup>29</sup> G. Marek and M. Gordon-Smith, *Chopin*, New York 1978, p. 246.

<sup>30</sup> K. Walton, *Listening with Imagination. Is Music Representational?*, in: J. Robinson (ed.), *Music and Meaning*, Ithaca and London 1997, p. 71-72.

nal integrity” of musical performance<sup>31</sup>. From this, as from the earlier examples of the phenomenon of integrity and of the ways in which it is conceptualised, it ensues quite clearly that it has numerous connections with the sphere of the ontology of the musical work (one would ask if this applies only to the work of music as traditionally understood. How – if at all – should we interpret the “integrity” of those musical manifestations which on principle oppose the substance of this notion, just as they oppose the categories of “unity” or “identity” – in the theoretical sense or in the philosophical sense, as Ridley would have it?), with the sphere of cognition and experiencing on all the levels of their organisation (emotional, intellectual) and in respect to all the participants in musical communication (individual/community, composer/performer/receiver, critic and scholar, who is only seemingly capable of extricating himself from the subjective context of justifying his theoretic assertions). Finally, the notion of integrity also has connections in the axiological sphere, particularly in the relationship of aesthetic to ethical values. To the question ontology or aesthetics? aesthetics or ethics? cognition or experience? I do not seek an answer here, as I have doubts as to whether such an explanation, although desirable for disinterestedly enquiring science, would resolve any of the blessed riddles set us by the art of music.

*Translated by John Comber*

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<sup>31</sup> S. Godlovitch, *The Integrity of Musical Performance*, “Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism” 1993, No 51/4, p. 580.